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Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive productivity analysis of 53 Australian water service 
providers during the period 2006-2012. Pressures for sector reform have stimulated interest in 
identifying and understanding the factors that can contribute to improve the performance of 
Australian water utilities. The aim is to provide to the policy-makers quantitative-evidences that 
allow to identify the best interventions, in relation to the alternative forms of ownership that 
characterize the water utilities in the different territories\states of Australia, to obtain productivity 
gains. 
 
 
Keywords: Australian water utilities, DEA, bootstrap, kernel density, ownership. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the relative performance of water utilities in Australia to 
identify best performers and areas of weakness in the sector. The results can help decision-makers 
better direct investment funds into projects that will further develop the water sector in the country. 
Water users in Australia can be divided into two groups: (i) agricultural and (ii) residential and 
industrial. The businesses that supply water to the latter group of consumers can also be divided 
into two groups: (i) businesses that primarily supply water to small regional towns and rural 
communities, and (ii) larger businesses that generally supply water to the state capital cities and 
larger regional cities. The latter group of large businesses are the focus of the present study. This is 
for two reasons. First, these large businesses are generally owned by state governments or territories 
and their prices tend to be regulated by independent regulatory agencies, while the smaller 
businesses are usually owned by local town councils, without formal independent price regulation 
(Coelli and Shannon, 2005).  
Regulation of the water utilities has become increasingly important in the Australian economy. 
Since the early 1990s a number of reforms have been implemented in the water industry with the 
aim to obtain a more commercial configuration of the utilities, which generally remains in 
government ownership. The key changes (Maddock, 1996) introduced concern : (i) a corporate 
structure of management; (ii) a fair rate of return on capital invested; and (iii) prices set by an 
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independent regulatory authority. Each state and territory has a regulatory authority that is in charge 
for regulating prices. The different state regulators use similar but not identical methods in 
regulating water prices. Moreover, the existence of a regulation mechanism affects the productivity 
evolution of the water utilities (Coelli and Walding, 2005). So in this framework DEA is a 
particularly powerful tool for assess the effect that the  regulation mechanisms have on productivity.  
Various approaches have been used in the literature to deal with efficiency. One of 
the most widely known, and accepted, is DEA where the frontier, constructed using linear 
programming, is the benchmark against which the relative performance of the decision 
making units (DMU), that is the hospitals in our analysis, is measured. DEA is a non-parametric 
methodology that constructs an efficiency frontier based on the production units which use the least 
inputs to produce a certain output or alternatively produce the most output for a given inputs. The 
production units that lie on the frontier are called efficient. Then, the efficiencies of the other 
production units are defined relative to these efficient production units. As highlighted by Simar 
and Wilson (1998) the efficiency calculated by DEA, is an estimate of the true (and unknown) 
production frontier, conditional on observed data resulting from an underlying 
data-generating process. As a consequence, DEA efficiencies are biased by construction 
and are sensitive to the sampling variations of the obtained frontier. So, to overcome this 
problem, Simar and Wilson (1998) proposed a bootstrap procedure to approximate the 
sampling distribution of the efficiency scores and to make inferences. The consistency of 
this procedure was established by Kneip et al. (2011). Most empirical applications of DEA have 
investigated the efficiency in different fields: utilities (Coelli and Walding, 2005), hospitals 
(Grosskopf and Valdmanis, 1993; Grosskopf et al., 2001, 2004; Ferrier et al., 2006; Djema and 
Djerdjouri, 2012; De Nicola et al., 2012; De Nicola et al. 2013a, 2013b), cross country economic 
growth (Ceccobelli et al., 2011, 2012) and airports (Curi et al., 2008, 2011; Gitto and Mancuso, 
2012a, 2012b, De Nicola et al. 2013c). From our search of the published literature, we were unable 
to identify any studies that have applied these new developments of DEA on Australian water 
supply businesses. The study is organized as follows. In Section 2, the methodology is described. 
Section 3 examines the empirical results. Section 4 concludes 
 
2. Methodology 
Bootstrap-DEA 
We employ DEA to compute the Malmquist productivity index (Färe et al., 1992). We use an 
input-orientated model because producers are required to meet market demand and can freely adjust 
the input usage (Lovell, 1993). Following the papers by Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999), we analyze 
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the productivity evolution of water utilities in an inferential setting. In fact, as noted by the two 
authors, the traditional DEA estimator is biased by construction and is affected by the uncertainty 
resulting from sample variation. In a deterministic setting, the Malmquist index for each airport, or 
Decision Making Unit (DMU), is obtained by solving four DEA problems. (See Thanassoulis et al. 
(2008) and Simar and Wilson (2008) for details.) The DEA basic model, which assumes constant 
returns to scale everywhere, measures the distance                 of DMU i, at time t, relative to 
technology existing at the same period and it is always greater than one. Computing the Malmquist 
index requires additional distance functions to be defined:                   is the distance of DMU i 
at time t, relative to technology at the period t+1.  
The Malmquist input-oriented index between periods t and t+1, can be defined as (Färe et al. 
1992, 1995):  
  
      
                     
               
  
                   
                     
               
                 
        
             
     
 (1) 
where 1, ttiEffch  and 
1, tt
iTechch  represent the efficiency change and technological change, 
respectively. Efficiency change identifies the movements toward the frontier, whereas technological 
change measures the shift of the frontier. Values of  
     
, 1, ttiEffch , 
1, tt
iTechch  
or less (or greater) 
than one indicate productivity growth (or decline) for the DMU i (i=1,2,…,n) between period t and 
t+1. However, relation (1) does not allow us to determine whether changes in productivity, 
efficiency, or technology are real or merely artifacts of the fact that we do not know the true 
production frontiers and must estimate them from a finite sample (Simar and Wilson, 1999). Thus, 
we employ a consistent bootstrap estimation procedure for correcting and obtaining confidence 
intervals for the Malmquist index and its components two components. The idea underlying the 
bootstrap is to approximate the sampling distributions of the Malmquist index by simulating the 
data generating process (DGP). In other terms, given the estimates    
     
of the unknown true 
values of  
     
 we generate through the DGP process a series of pseudo datasets to obtain 
bootstrap estimate   
      
. Simar and Wilson (1998) discussed the problems that arise for 
bootstrapping in DEA models and they suggested the use of a smooth bootstrap procedure. In 
addition, the Malmquist index uses panel data, with the possibility of temporal correlation. For this 
reason, Simar and Wilson (1999) modified the bootstrap algorithm for efficiency scores to preserve 
any temporal correlation present in the data by applying a bivariate smoothing procedure.  
The bias-corrected estimates of the Malmquist index, are obtained from: 
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However, the correction of the bias introduces additional noise, which increase the variance of the 
estimator. Thus, as rule of thumb, Simar and Wilson (1999) recommended that one not correct for 
the bias unless                     
      , where           
       is the sample standard deviation of 
the bootstrap values. The construction of the confidence intervals is obtained sorting the values 
       
         
      
   
 
in increasing order and deletes the 







100
2
-percent of the elements at either 
end of the sorted list. Then, for setting *ˆa  and 
*ˆ
b  (with 
*aˆ <
*bˆ ), which is equal to the 
endpoints of the sorted array, the estimated  1 -percent confidence interval for the productivity 
index is: 
   
        
    
         
         
      (3) 
Relations (2) and (3) are similarly computed for the two components of the productivity index: 
efficiency change and technological change. With the obtained confidence interval for Malmquist 
index and its components, it is possible to determine whether productivity improvement (or decline) 
is significant at the established confidence level.  
 
 
Testing the difference in Malmquist distributions 
 The main questions of the present paper concern the evaluation of the impact of several 
environmental variables on Malmquist productivity. To address these questions and to complete the 
previous analysis, we test for the statistical significance of differences between distributions. We 
use the test proposed by Li et al. (2009): the null hypothesis states that the two distributions can be 
considered equal. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Data 
We consider a balanced panel data of 53 Australian water utility between 2006 and 2012. Our 
sample includes the main water utility characterized by different ownerships and operational 
characteristics. Data has been collected from the national performance report (Australian 
Government -National Water Commission-, 2006-2012). In the computation of the Malmquist 
index we employ one output, the total urban water supplied (tuv) and two inputs: length of water 
main pipelines (lwm) and operating cost (oc). In Figure 1 the boxplots related to the three variables 
employed in the analysis is shown.  
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Figure 2. Boxplots of the output and inputs. In panel a), the volume of water supplied (ML). In 
panels b) and c) the operating costs and the length of water main pipelines, respectively, are shown. 
 
From the analysis of Figure 1, panel a), it can be noticed that the total volume of water supplied 
rose slightly from 2010 to 2012 after a period of steadily decline. Looking at the two inputs, the 
box-plots in panel b) reveal a progressive increase of the operating cost, especially since 2009 when 
the dispersion has increased. In other terms the rise of operative costs has not been homogeneous 
among the 53 water utilities. Finally, panel c) indicates a moderate increase in the length of water 
main pipelines. One of the most interesting aspects of the Australian water industry is the existence 
of a alternative approaches, in each state/territory, to the management of the water services in terms 
of form of ownership and degree of government intervention (i.e. service delivery model and 
regulatory agencies). In what it follows we classify the 53 water municipality in three groups 
according to the type of ownership and the degree of state and local government intervention: 
1) State Owned utilities servicing entire urban area (SO) 
2) Private Integrated utilities (PI) 
3) Local Government utilities (LG) 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the 53 Australian water utilities by the form of ownership. 
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Ownership form Frequency 
SO 12 
PI 18 
LG 23 
TOT 53 
Table 1. The distribution of the Australian water utilities by ownership form. SO= State Owned 
utilities; PI= Private Integrated utilities; LG=Local Government utilities. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Preliminary analysis: TF, Effch and Techch  
As noticed in the previous section the input and output show an high level of the dispersion over 
the considered time period. So, the measurement of the TFP should be carefully carried in order to 
avoid a biased analysis of the productivity evolution. In the present work the choice of the time 
period to consider to evaluate the performance of the water utility in Australia has been driven by 
the utilization of three statistical tests. The tests allow to identify if the differences between the TFP 
and its two component, Effch and Techch, calculated in two different time periods are statistically 
significant. In Figure 2 and Table 2 the results of the analysis of the distributions related to two sub-
periods, 2006-2009 and 2009-2012, are respectively shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distributions of TFP, Effch and Techch. The solid line refers to the period 2005-2009, 
and the dashed line to the period 2009-2012.Vertical lines represent means. In panel a),the TFP 
distribution are described. In panels b) and c) the distributions of Effch and Techch ,respectively, 
are shown. 
a) b) 
c) 
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Li’s Test 
H0: equality of distributions Test Statistic P-Val Decision 
f(TFP(2006-2008))=f(TFP(2008-2012)) 2.629 0.023 H0 rejected 
f(Effch(2006-2008))=f(Effch(2008-2012)) 21.466 0.000 H0 rejected 
f(Techch(2006-2008))=f(Techch2008-2012)) 12.178 0.000 H0 rejected 
    
Kolmogorov Smirnov test 
f(TFP(2006-2008))=f(TFP(2008-2012)) 0.2453 0.082 H0 rejected 
f(Effch(2006-2008))=f(Effch(2008-2012)) 0.6981 0.000 H0 rejected 
f(Techch(2006-2008))=f(Techch(2008-2012)) 0.6038 0.000 H0 rejected 
    
Wilcoxon rank sum test 
Rank(TFP(2006-2008))= Rank(TFP(2008-2012)) 1759 0.025 H0 rejected 
Rank(Effchch(2006-2008))= Rank(Effchch(2008-2012)) 2412 0.000 H0 rejected 
Rank(Techch(2006-2008))= Rank(Techch(2008-2012)) 165 0.000 H0 rejected 
Table 2. Li’s Test, Kolmogorov Smirnov Test and Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
 
Figure 2 and Table 2 reveal that in order to obtain a reliable analysis of the productivity evolution 
of the Australian water utilities the total factor productivity should be separately computed in the 
two periods: 2006-2009 and 2009-2012. Moreover, the analysis highlights that the main factor that 
contributes to generate the difference in productivity evolution, between the two periods, is the 
technological change (see Figure 2, panel c)). 
In Figure 3 the evolutions of the TFP, Effch and Techch for the whole time horizon (2006-2012) 
and the two sub-periods, 2006-2008 and 2008-2012, are shown. 
 
 
Figure 3. TFP, Effch and Tech evolutions. 
 
Looking at the table it can be noticed that the total factor productivity of the Australian water 
sector has experienced a decline in productivity of about 20% over the period 2009-2012. However, 
the decline has been higher in the first period (2006-2009) than in the second one. Moreover, the 
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main source of the productive slowdown is clearly different in the two periods. In fact, while during 
the first three years the efficiency change is the main cause of the decline in the TPP the opposite 
has occurred from 2009 to 2012 when technological change has had a negative effect on the 
productivity evolution of the Australian water utilities. 
 
4.2. The effect of ownership 
After obtaining the estimates of the TFP, Ecch and Techch, we use the kernel density estimator to 
evaluate if the alternative forms of ownership result in differential impacts on the productivity 
evolution and its main components. The analysis has been conducted separately for the two sub-
periods. For the period 2006-2009 the results are shown in Figure 4 and Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distributions of TFP, Effch and Techch in the period 2006-2009. The solid line refers to 
the State owned utilities, the dashed line to the private integrated utilities and the dash dotted line to 
the local government utilities. Vertical lines represent means. In panel a), the TFP distribution are 
described. In panels b) and c) the distributions of Effch and Techch, respectively, are shown. 
 
Li’s Test 
H0: equality of distributions Test Statistic P-Val Decision 
f(TFP(of=SO)=f(TFP(of=PI)) 0.782 0.017 H0 is not rejected 
f(TFP(of=SO))=f(TFP(of=LG)) 0.246 0.263 H0 is not rejected 
f(TFP(of=PI))=f(TFP(of=LG)) -0.198 0.222 H0 is not rejected 
    
c) 
a) b) 
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f(Effch(of=SO)=f(Effch(of=PI)) 0.285 0.171 H0 is not rejected 
f(Effch(of=SO))=f(Effch(of=LG)) -0.339 0.258 H0 is not rejected 
f(Effch(of=PI))=f(Effch(of=LG)) 0.652 0.648 H0 is not rejected 
    
f(Techch(of=SO)=f(Techch (of=PI)) 3.205 0.005 H0 rejected 
f(Techch(of=SO))=f(Techch(of=LG)) 5.90 0.003 H0 rejected 
f(Techch(of=PI))=f(Techch(of=LG)) 2.301 0.451 H0 rejected 
Table 2. Li’s Test on TFP, Effch and Techch. of=ownership form; SO= State Owned utilities; PI= 
Private Integrated utilities; LG=Local Government utilities. Time period 2006-2009. 
 
The results reported in the Figure 4 and the Table 3 highlights that while there are not significant 
differences in the TFP and in the Effch among the three alternative forms of governance. On the 
contrary we can conclude that the State owned utilities servicing entire urban area have been 
characterized, on average, by a significant technological decline. Taking into consideration the 
second period, 2009-2012 (Figure 5 and Table 4), further insight can be obtained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Distributions of TFP, Effch and Techch in the period 2009-2012. The solid line refers to 
the State owned utilities, the dashed line to the private integrated utilities and the dash dotted line to 
the local government utilities. Vertical lines represent means. In panel a), the TFP distribution are 
described. In panels b) and c) the distributions of Effch and Techch, respectively, are shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
a) b) 
c) 
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Li’s Test 
H0: equality of distributions Test Statistic P-Val Decision 
f(TFP(of=SO)=f(TFP(of=PI)) 1.640 0.009 H0 is not rejected 
f(TFP(of=SO))=f(TFP(of=LG)) 0.893 0.041 H0 is not rejected 
f(TFP(of=PI))=f(TFP(of=LG)) 0.770 0.648 H0 is rejected 
    
f(Effch(of=SO)=f(Effch(of=PI)) -1.099 0.047 H0 is rejected 
f(Effch(of=SO))=f(Effch (of=LG)) 1.478 0.036 H0 is not rejected 
f(Effch(of=PI))=f(Effch (of=LG)) 1.105 0.547 H0 is not rejected 
    
f(Techch(of=SO)=f(Techch(of=PI)) 2.375 0.008 H0 is not rejected 
f(Techch(of=SO))=f(Techch(of=LG)) 7.004 0.000 H0 is not rejected 
f(Techch(of=PI))=f(Techch(of=LG)) 4.399 0.195 H0 is rejected 
Table 4. Li’s Test on TFP, Effch and Techch. of=ownership form; SO= State Owned utilities; PI= 
Private Integrated utilities; LG=Local Government utilities. Time period 2009-2012. 
 
The analysis of the TFP distributions, panel a), and the Li’ tests reveal that in the period from 2009 
to 2012 the State owned utilities have exerted an productive performance which is statistically 
better than those achieved by the private integrated and local government utilities. Moreover, all the 
water utilities have obtained productivity gain trough a better input-output configuration, see panel 
b). Finally the distributions of the Techch, panel c), indicate a technology decline which is higher 
for private integrated and local government utilities than State owned ones. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The present paper employing a bootstrapped DEA techniques to estimate TFP and its two main 
components, efficiency and technical change, offers an interesting analysis on the relation between 
the productive evolution and the forms of governance of 53 Australian water utilities over the 
period 2006-2012. The paper highlights as the water industry as steadily declined its efficiency 
especially during the two last year of the considered time horizon. Under a political perspective the 
empirical analysis highlights as the Government utilities as has marked the highest slowdown in the 
productivity evolution mostly lead by a technological regress.  
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